



Prof. Jason Raibley

The University of Kansas

Explaining the Normativity of Well-being

Date : 7 May 2026 (Thursday)

Time : 16:20 – 17:50

Venue : LKK305 & Zoom Seminar

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Well-being is normative in two distinct senses. First, well-being plays an indispensable deliberative role in self-interested reasoning, beneficence, and policy design—a role (contra Hurka) sufficient to establish its normativity without appeal to further "evaluative content." Second, welfare-facts characteristically generate pro tanto agent-relative reasons for self-concern and care as a matter of natural necessity. Modifying examples from Fletcher and Parfit, I argue against Moorean, Stoic, and Humean forms of skepticism about welfare's normativity, as well as Worsnip's dualism. If we properly distinguish constraining from recommending reasons, and obligation from ought, we can clarify how prudential reasons function at the all-things-considered level. I then sketch an account of well-being as robust agential functioning and offer a naturalistic explanation of why prudential reasons are real, developing a Stoicized Humean Constructivism that augments Lenman's holistic Humeanism with insights from Street, M. Smith, and Becker.

All are welcome!

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